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Abstract
In this paper we analyse some of the classical paradoxes in Social
Choice Theory (namely, the Condorcet paradox, the discursive dilemma,
the Ostrogorski paradox and the multiple election paradox) using a general
framework for the study of aggregation problems called binary aggrega-
tion with integrity constraints. We provide a definition of paradox that
is general enough to account for the four cases mentioned, and identify a
common structure in the syntactic properties of the rationality assump-
tions that lie behind such paradoxes. We generalise this observation by
providing a full characterisation of the set of rationality assumptions on
which the majority rule does not generate a paradox.
1 Introduction
Most work in Social Choice Theory started with the observation of paradoxical
situations. From the Marquis de Condorcet (1785) to more recent American
court cases (Kornhauser and Sager, 1986), a wide collection of paradoxes have
been analysed and studied in the literature on Social Choice Theory (see, e.g.,
Nurmi, 1999). More recently, researchers in Artificial Intelligence and in par-
ticular from the novel research area of Computational Social Choice (see, e.g.,
Brandt et al., 2013) have become interested in the study of collective choice
problems in which the set of alternatives has a combinatorial structure. Novel
paradoxical situations emerged from the study of these situations, and the com-
binatorial structure of the domains gave rise to interesting computational chal-
lenges (Chevaleyre et al., 2008).
This paper concentrates on the use of the majority rule in binary combina-
torial domains, and investigates the question of what constitutes a paradox in
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such a setting. We identify a common structure behind the most classical para-
doxes in Social Choice Theory, putting forward a general definition of paradox in
aggregation theory. By characterising paradoxical situations by means of com-
putationally recognisable properties, we aim at providing more domain-specific
research with new tools for the development of safe procedures for collective
decision making.
We base the analysis on our previous work on binary aggregation with in-
tegrity constraints (Grandi and Endriss, 2011, 2013), which constitutes a gen-
eral framework for the study of aggregation problems. In this setting, a set
of individuals needs to take a decision over a set of binary issues, and these
choices are then aggregated into a collective one. Given a rationality assump-
tion that binds the choices of the individuals, we define a paradox as a situation
in which all individuals are rational but the collective outcome is not. We
present some of the most well-known paradoxes that arise from the use of the
majority rule in different contexts, and we show how they can be expressed in bi-
nary aggregation as instances of this general definition. Our analysis focuses on
the Condorcet paradox (1785), the discursive dilemma in judgment aggregation
(Kornhauser and Sager, 1986; List and Pettit, 2002), the Ostrogorski paradox
(1902) and the more recent work of Brams et al. (1998) on multiple election
paradoxes.
Such a uniform representation of the most important paradoxes in Social
Choice Theory enables us to make a crucial observation concerning the syn-
tactic structure of the rationality assumptions that lie behind these paradoxes.
We represent rationality assumptions by means of logical formulas in a simple
propositional language, and we observe that all formulas formalising a number of
classical paradoxes feature a disjunction of literals of size at least 3. This obser-
vation can be generalised to a full characterisation of the rationality assumptions
on which the majority rule does not generate a paradox, and in Theorem 1 we
identify them as those formulas that are equivalent to a conjunction of clauses
of size at most 2.
This work needs to be positioned in the growing literature on judgment
aggregation (see, e.g., List and Puppe, 2009), and we discuss in a dedicated
section the relation between classical frameworks for judgment aggregation and
our setting. While many of the findings shown in this paper can be traced
back to known results from this literature, to the best of our knowledge this
paper presents the first comprehensive study of paradoxes in aggregation theory
and puts forward a simple yet general framework for a unified analysis of such
recurrent situations.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we give the basic defini-
tions of the framework of binary aggregation with integrity constraints, and we
provide a general definition of paradox. In Section 3 we show how a number
of paradoxical situations in Social Choice Theory can be seen as instances of
our general definition of paradox, and we identify a syntactic property that is
common to all paradoxical rationality assumptions. Section 4 provides a syn-
tactic characterisation of the paradoxical situations for the majority rule, and
Section 5 concludes the paper.
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2 Binary Aggregation with Integrity Constraints
In this section we provide the basic definitions of the framework of binary
aggregation with integrity constraints which we developed in previous work
(Grandi and Endriss, 2011) based on work by Wilson (1975) and Dokow and
Holzman (Dokow and Holzman, 2009, 2010a). In this setting, a number of in-
dividuals each need to make a yes/no choice regarding a number of issues and
these choices then need to be aggregated into a collective choice. Paradoxical
situations may occur when a set of individual choices that is considered ra-
tional leads to a collective outcome which fails to satisfy the same rationality
assumption of the individuals.
2.1 Terminology and Notation
Let I = {1, . . . ,m} be a finite set of issues, and let D = D1 × · · · × Dm be
a boolean combinatorial domain, i.e., |Dj | = 2 for all j ∈ I. Without loss of
generality we assume that Dj = {0, 1} for all j. Thus, given a set of issues I,
the domain associated with it is D = {0, 1}I. A ballot B is an element of D.
In many applications it is necessary to specify which elements of the do-
main are rational and which should not be taken into consideration. Proposi-
tional logic provides a suitable formal language to express possible restrictions
of rationality on binary combinatorial domains. If I is a set of m issues, let
PS = {p1, . . . , pm} be a set of propositional symbols, one for each issue, and
let LPS be the propositional language constructed by closing PS under propo-
sitional connectives. For any formula ϕ ∈ LPS, let Mod(ϕ) be the set of assign-
ments that satisfy ϕ. For example, Mod(p1 ∧ ¬p2) = {(1, 0, 0), (1, 0, 1)} when
PS = {p1, p2, p3}. An integrity constraint is any formula IC ∈ LPS.
Integrity constraints can be used to define what tuples in D we consider
rational choices. Any ballot B ∈ D is an assignment to the variables p1, . . . , pm,
and we call B a rational ballot if it satisfies the integrity constraint IC, i.e., if
B is an element of Mod(IC). In the sequel we shall use the terms “integrity
constraints” and “rationality assumptions” interchangeably.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of individuals. We make the assumption
that there are at least 2 individuals. Each individual submits a ballot Bi ∈ D
to form a profile B = (B1, . . . , Bn). We write bj for the jth element of a ballot
B, and bi,j for the jth element of ballot Bi within a profile B = (B1, . . . , Bn).
Given a finite set of issues I and a finite set of individuals N , an aggregation
procedure is a function F : DN → D, mapping each profile of binary ballots to
an element of D. Let F (B)j denote the result of the aggregation of profile B
on issue j.
2.2 A General Definition of Paradox
Consider the following example: Let IC = p1 ∧ p2 → p3 and suppose there are
three individuals, choosing ballots (0, 1, 0), (1, 0, 0) and (1, 1, 1). Their choices
are rational (they all satisfy IC). However, if we employ the majority rule, i.e.,
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we accept an issue j if and only if a majority of individuals do, we obtain the
ballot (1, 1, 0) as collective outcome, which fails to be rational. This kind of
observation is often referred to as a paradox.
We now give a general definition of paradoxical behaviour of an aggregation
procedure in terms of the violation of certain rationality assumptions.
Definition 1. A paradox is a triple (F,B, IC), where F is an aggregation
procedure, B is a profile in DN , IC is an integrity constraint in LPS, and
Bi ∈ Mod(IC) for all i ∈ N but F (B) 6∈ Mod(IC).
A closely related notion is that of collective rationality:
Definition 2. Given an integrity constraint IC ∈ LPS, an aggregation proce-
dure F is called collectively rational (CR) with respect to IC, if for all rational
profiles B ∈ Mod(IC)N we have that F (B) ∈ Mod(IC).
Thus, F is CR with respect to IC if it lifts the rationality assumption given by
IC from the individual to the collective level, i.e., if F (B) ∈ Mod(IC) whenever
Bi ∈ Mod(IC) for all i ∈ N . An aggregation procedure that is CR with respect
to IC cannot generate a paradoxical situation with IC as integrity constraint.
2.3 Related Work in Binary Aggregation
Wilson (1975) has been the first to define and study the framework of binary
aggregation. His seminal paper contains several impossibility results for aggrega-
tion procedures satisfying an axiomatic property known as independence, includ-
ing a generalisation of the famous impossibility result by Arrow (1963). Wilson’s
notion of responsive aggregator corresponds to our notion of collective rational-
ity with respect to a family of integrity constraints. Rubinstein and Fishburn
(1986) generalised Wilson’s framework allowing individuals to choose elements
of certain vector spaces. The case of binary aggregation is subsumed by consid-
ering the vector space D = {0, 1}I.
A similar setting has been investigated more recently by Dokow and Holzman
(2009, 2010a). Their definition of collective rationality is the same as Wilson’s,
although they consider a single subdomain X ⊆ D of rational ballots at a time
rather than a family of such subsets. Note that propositional logic is fully ex-
pressive with respect to subsets of D, i.e., for every subset X ⊆ D there exists
a formula ϕX such that Mod(ϕX) = X , hence our approach is equivalent to
that of Dokow and Holzman. Our choice of using formulas rather than sets
is motivated by the possibility of classifying integrity constraints by means of
syntactic properties and by the the compactness of this representation.
Another framework for binary aggregation has been proposed by Nehring
and Puppe (Nehring and Puppe, 2007, 2010). Although their aim is more gen-
eral, they also concentrate on the study of aggregation procedures over property
spaces, a setting that is closer to the original framework of Wilson (1975).
An important, although not substantial, difference between our framework
and classical approaches to binary aggregation resides in our definition of aggre-
gation procedure. Both Dokow and Holzman (2010a) and Nehring and Puppe
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(2007) define an aggregation procedure on a specific domain X ⊆ {0, 1}m, in-
cluding in this definition the notion of collective rationality with respect to the
integrity constraint that defines X . The same approach is also used in the lit-
erature on judgment aggregation (List and Puppe, 2009). Instead, we define
aggregation procedures on all possible profiles, studying collective rationality as
an additional property of an aggregator. Our choice is motivated by an attempt
to separate the definition of an aggregation procedure and its axiomatic prop-
erties from the notion of collective rationality, which depends on the domain of
rational ballots on which the aggregation is performed.
In several papers (see, e.g., List and Puppe, 2009; Nehring and Puppe, 2010;
Dokow and Holzman, 2010a) it has been observed that the framework of judg-
ment aggregation for propositional logic is equivalent to that of binary aggrega-
tion. In Section 3.2 we discuss in detail the relation between judgment aggre-
gation and binary aggregation.
3 Unifying Paradoxes in Binary Aggregation
In this section we present a number of classical paradoxes from Social Choice
Theory, and we show how they can be seen as instances of our Definition 1.
In Section 3.1 we introduce the Condorcet paradox, and we show how settings
of preference aggregation can be seen as instances of binary aggregation by
devising a suitable integrity constraint. Section 3.2 repeats this construction
for the framework of judgment aggregation and for the discursive dilemma. In
Section 3.3 we then deal with the Ostrogorski paradox, in which a paradoxical
feature of representative majoritarian systems is analysed, and in Section 3.4 we
conclude by identifying a common structure in the integrity constraints that lie
behind those paradoxes. Section 3.5 presents two further paradoxes that occur
when voting with multiple issues.
3.1 The Condorcet Paradox and Preference Aggregation
During the Enlightment period in France, several active scholars dedicated
themselves to the problem of collective choice, and in particular to the creation
of new procedures for the election of candidates. Although these are not the
first documented studies of the problem of social choice (McLean and Urken,
1995), Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, the Marquis de Condorcet, was
the first to point out a crucial problem of the most basic voting rule that was
being used, the majority rule (Condorcet, 1785). The paradox he discovered,
that now comes under his name, is explained in the following paragraphs:
Condorcet Paradox. Three individuals need to decide on the
ranking of three alternatives {△,#,}. Each individual expresses
her own ranking and the collective outcome is aggregated by pairwise
majority: an alternative is preferred to a second one if and only if a
majority of the individuals prefer the first alternative to the second.
Consider the following situation:
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△ <1 # <1 
 <2 △ <2 #
# <3  <3 △
△ < # <  < △
When computing the outcome of the pairwise majority rule, we no-
tice that there is a majority of individuals preferring the circle to the
triangle (△ < #); that there is a majority of individuals preferring
the square to the circle (# < ); and, finally, that there is a major-
ity of individuals preferring the triangle to the square ( < △). The
resulting outcome fails to be a linear order, giving rise to a circular
collective preference between the alternatives.
3.1.1 Preference Aggregation
Condorcet’s paradox was rediscovered in the second half of the XXth century
while a whole theory of preference aggregation was being developed (see, e.g.,
Gaertner, 2006). This framework considers a finite set of individuals N ex-
pressing preferences over a finite set of alternatives X . A preference relation is
represented by a binary relation over X . Preference relations are traditionally
assumed to be weak orders, i.e., reflexive, transitive and complete binary rela-
tions. Another common assumption is representing preferences as linear orders,
i.e., irreflexive, transitive and complete binary relations. In the sequel we shall
assume that preferences are represented as linear orders, writing aPb for “alter-
native a is strictly preferred to b”. Each individual in N submits a linear order
Pi, forming a profile P = (P1, . . . , P|N |). Let L(X ) denote the set of all linear
orders on X . Given a finite set of individuals N and a finite set of alternatives
X , a social welfare function is a function F : L(X )N → L(X).
3.1.2 Translation
Given a preference aggregation problem defined by a set of individuals N and a
set of alternatives X , let us consider the following setting for binary aggregation.
Define a set of issues IX as the set of all pairs (a, b) in X . The domain DX
of aggregation is {0, 1}|X |
2
. In this setting, a binary ballot B corresponds to
a binary relation P over X : B(a,b) = 1 if and only if a is in relation to b
(aPb). Given this representation, we can associate with every SWF for X and
N an aggregation procedure that is defined on a subdomain of DNX . We now
characterise this domain as the set of models of a suitable integrity constraint.
Using the propositional language LPS constructed over the set IX , we can
express properties of binary ballots in DX . In this case LPS consists of |X |2
propositional symbols, which we call pab for every issue (a, b). The properties
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△# # △
Voter 1 1 1 1
Voter 2 1 0 0
Voter 3 0 1 0
Maj 1 1 0
Table 1: The Condorcet paradox in binary aggregation.
of linear orders can be enforced on binary ballots using the following set of
integrity constraints, which we shall call IC<:
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Irreflexivity: ¬paa for all a ∈ X
Completeness: pab ∨ pba for all a 6= b ∈ X
Transitivity: pab ∧ pbc→pac for a, b, c ∈ X pairwise distinct
In case preferences are expressed using weak orders rather than linear orders,
it is sufficient to replace the integrity constraints of irreflexivity in IC< with
their negation to obtain a similar correspondence between SWFs and aggrega-
tion procedures. By dropping the axiom of completeness instead, we obtain
preference aggregation with partial orders. Many other classical properties of
preferences can be expressed with this formalism. A notable example is the
property of negative transitivity, which is expressed by the following integrity
constraint: ¬pab ∧ ¬pbc → ¬pac for a, b, c ∈ X pairwise distinct.
3.1.3 The Condorcet Paradox in Binary Aggregation
The translation presented in the previous section enables us to express the
Condorcet paradox in terms of Definition 1. Let X = {△,#,} and let N
contain three individuals. Consider the profile B for IX in the Table 3.1.3,
where we have omitted the values of the reflexive issues (△,△) (always 0 by
IC<), and specified the value of only one of (△,#) and (#,△) (the other can
be obtained by taking the opposite of the value of the first), and accordingly for
the other alternatives. Every individual ballot satisfies IC<, but the outcome
obtained using the majority ruleMaj (which corresponds to pairwise majority in
preference aggregation) does not satisfy IC<: the formula p△# ∧ p# → p△ is
falsified by the outcome. Therefore, (Maj ,B, IC<) is a paradox by Definition 1.
3.2 The Discursive Dilemma and Judgment Aggregation
The discursive dilemma emerged from the formal study of court cases that was
carried out in recent years in the literature on law and economics, generalising
1We will use the notation IC both for a single integrity constraint and for a set of formulas—
in the latter case considering as the actual constraint the conjunction of all the formulas in
IC.
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the observation of a paradoxical situation known as the “doctrinal paradox”
(Kornhauser and Sager, 1986). Such a setting was first given mathematical
treatment by List and Pettit (2002), giving rise to an entirely new research area
in Social Choice Theory known as judgment aggregation. Earlier versions of this
paradox can be found in work by Guilbaud (1952) and Vacca (1922). We now
describe one of the most common versions of the discursive dilemma:
Discursive Dilemma. A court of three judges has to decide on the
liability of a defendant under the charge of breach of contract. An
individual is considered liable if there was a valid contract and her
behaviour was such as to be considered a breach of the contract. The
court takes three majority decisions on the following issues: there
was a valid contract (α), the individual broke the contract (β), the
defendant is liable (α ∧ β). Consider the following situation:
α β α ∧ β
Judge 1 yes yes yes
Judge 2 no yes no
Judge 3 yes no no
Majority yes yes no
All judges express consistent judgments: they accept the third propo-
sition if and only if the first two are accepted. However, even if there
is a majority of judges who believe that there was a valid contract,
and even if there is a majority of judges who believe that the indi-
vidual broke the contract, the individual is considered not liable by
a majority of the individuals.
3.2.1 Judgment Aggregation
Judgement aggregation (JA) considers problems in which a finite set of individ-
uals N has to generate a collective judgment over a set of interconnected propo-
sitional formulas (see, e.g., List and Puppe, 2009). Formally, given a propo-
sitional language L, an agenda is a finite nonempty subset Φ ⊆ L that does
not contain doubly-negated formulas and is closed under complementation (i.e,
α ∈ Φ whenever ¬α ∈ Φ, and ¬α ∈ Φ for non-negated α ∈ Φ).
Each individual in N expresses a judgment set J ⊆ Φ, as the set of those
formulas in the agenda that she judges to be true. Every individual judgment
set J is assumed to be complete (i.e., for each α ∈ Φ either α or its complement
are in J) and consistent (i.e., there exists an assignment that makes all formulas
in J true). Denote by J (Φ) the set of all complete and consistent subsets of Φ.
Given a finite agenda Φ and a finite set of individuals N , a JA procedure for Φ
and N is a function F : J (Φ)N → 2Φ.
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3.2.2 Translation
Given a judgment aggregation framework defined by an agenda Φ and a set
of individuals N , let us now construct a setting for binary aggregation with
integrity constraints that interprets it. Let the set of issues IΦ be equal to the
set of formulas in Φ. The domain DΦ of aggregation is therefore {0, 1}|Φ|. In
this setting, a binary ballot B corresponds to a judgment set: Bα = 1 if and only
if α ∈ J . Given this representation, we can associate with every JA procedure
for Φ and N a binary aggregation procedure on a subdomain of DNΦ .
It is important to remark that this is not exactly the standard way of inter-
preting JA in binary aggregation. The embedding that is given, for instance,
by Dokow and Holzman (2009, 2010a), associates with every judgment set a
binary ballot over a set of issues representing only the positive formulas in Φ,
considering a rejection of the issue associated with a formula ϕ as an acceptance
of its negation ¬ϕ. The same embedding is given by List and Puppe (2009, Sec-
tion 2.3). In our translation we made the choice of introducing both an issue for
ϕ and one for ¬ϕ, adding an additional integrity constraint to enforce the com-
pleteness of a judgment set. This allows us to easily generalise the framework
to the case of incomplete ballots (see, e.g., Dietrich and List, 2008), without
having to resort to an additional symbol for abstention (as is done, e.g., by
Dokow and Holzman, 2010b)
As we did for the case of preference aggregation, we now define a set of
integrity constraints for DΦ to enforce the properties of consistency and com-
pleteness of individual judgment sets. Recall that the propositional language is
constructed in this case on |Φ| propositional symbols pα, one for every α ∈ Φ.
Call an inconsistent set of formulas each proper subset of which is consistent
minimally inconsistent set (mi-set). Let ICΦ be the following set of integrity
constraints:
Completeness: pα∨p¬α for all α ∈ Φ
Consistency: ¬(
∧
α∈S pα) for every mi-set S ⊆ Φ
While the interpretation of the first formula is straightforward, we provide some
further explanation for the second one. If a judgment set J is inconsistent, then
it contains a minimally inconsistent set, obtained by sequentially deleting one
formula at the time from J until it becomes consistent. This implies that the
constraint previously introduced is falsified by the binary ballot that represents
J , as all issues associated with formulas in a mi-set are accepted. Vice versa, if
all formulas in a mi-set are accepted by a given binary ballot, then clearly the
judgment set associated with it is inconsistent.
In conclusion, the same kind of correspondence we have shown for SWFs
holds between complete and consistent JA procedures and binary aggregation
procedures that are collectively rational with respect to ICΦ.
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α β α ∧ β
Judge 1 1 1 1
Judge 2 0 1 0
Judge 3 1 0 0
Maj 1 1 0
Table 2: The discursive dilemma in binary aggregation.
3.2.3 The Discursive Dilemma in Binary Aggregation
The same procedure that we have used to show that the Condorcet paradox
is an instance of our general definition of paradox applies here for the case of
the discursive dilemma. Let Φ be the agenda {α, β, α ∧ β}, in which we have
omitted negated formulas, as for any J ∈ J (Φ) their acceptance can be inferred
from the acceptance of their positive counterparts. Consider the profile B for
IΦ described in Table 3.2.3. Every individual ballot satisfies ICΦ, while the
outcome obtained by using the majority rule contradicts one of the constraints
of consistency, namely ¬(pα ∧ pβ ∧ p¬(α∧β)). Hence, (Maj ,B, ICΦ) constitutes
a paradox by Definition 1.
3.3 The Ostrogorski Paradox
Another paradox listed by Nurmi (1999) as one of the main paradoxes of the
majority rule on multiple issues is the Ostrogorski paradox. Ostrogorski (1902)
published a treaty in support of procedures inspired by direct democracy, point-
ing out several fallacies that a representative system based on party structures
can encounter. Rae and Daudt (1976) later focused on one such situation, pre-
senting it as a paradox or a dilemma between two equivalently desirable proce-
dures (the direct and the representative one), giving it the name of “Ostrogorski
paradox”. This paradox, in its simplest form, occurs when a majority of indi-
viduals are supporting a party that does not represent the view of a majority
of individuals on a majority of issues.
Ostrogorski Paradox. Consider the following situation: there is a
two party contest between the Mountain Party (MP) and the Plain
Party (PP); three individuals (or, equivalently, three equally big
groups in an electorate) will vote for one of the two parties if their
view agrees with that party on a majority of the three following
issues: economic policy (E), social policy (S), and foreign affairs
policy (F ). Consider the following situation:
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E S F Party supported
Voter 1 MP PP PP PP
Voter 2 PP PP MP PP
Voter 3 MP PP MP MP
Maj MP PP MP PP
The result of the two party contest, assuming that the party that
has the support of a majority of the voters wins, declares the Plain
Party the winner. However, a majority of individuals support the
Mountain Party both on the economic policy E and on the foreign
policy F. Thus, the elected party (the PP) is in disagreement with
a majority of the individuals on a majority of the issues.
Bezembinder and van Acker (1985) generalised this paradox, defining two dif-
ferent rules for compound majority decisions. The first, the representative out-
come, outputs as a winner the party that receives support by a majority of the
individuals. The second, the direct outcome, outputs the party that receives
support on a majority of issues by a majority of the individuals. An instance of
the Ostrogorski paradox occurs whenever the outcome of these two procedures
differ.
Stronger versions of the paradox can be devised, in which the losing party
represents the view of a majority on all the issues involved (see, e.g., Rae and
Daudt, 1976; see also our Table 3.3.1). Further studies of the “Ostrogorski
phenomenon” have been carried out by Deb and Kelsey (1987) as well as by
Eckert and Klamler (2009). The relation between the Ostrogorski paradox and
the Condorcet paradox has been investigated in several papers (Kelly, 1989;
Rae and Daudt, 1976), while a comparison with the discursive dilemma was
carried out by Pigozzi (2005).
3.3.1 The Ostrogorski Paradox in Binary Aggregation
In this section, we provide a binary aggregation setting that represents the Os-
trogorski paradox as a failure of collective rationality with respect to a suitable
integrity constraint.
Let {E, S, F} be the set of issues at stake, and let the set of issues IO =
{E, S, F,A} consist of the same issues plus an extra issue A to encode the
support for the first party (MP). A binary ballot over these issues represents
the individual view on the three issues E, S and F : if, for instance, bE = 1, then
the individual supports the first party MP on the first issue E. Moreover, it
also represents the overall support for party MP (in case issue A is accepted) or
PP (in case A is rejected). In the Ostrogorski paradox, an individual votes for a
party if and only if she agrees with that party on a majority of the issues. This
rule can be represented as a rationality assumption by means of the following
integrity constraint ICO:
pA ↔ [(pE ∧ pS) ∨ (pE ∧ pF ) ∨ (pS ∧ pF )]
11
E S F A
Voter 1 1 0 0 0
Voter 2 0 0 1 0
Voter 3 1 0 1 1
Maj 1 0 1 0
Table 3: The Ostrogorski paradox in binary aggregation.
E S F A
Voter 1 1 0 0 0
Voter 2 0 1 0 0
Voter 3 0 0 1 0
Voter 4 1 1 1 1
Voter 5 1 1 1 1
Maj 1 1 1 0
Table 4: Strict version of the Ostrogorski paradox in binary aggregation.
An instance of the Ostrogorski paradox can therefore be represented by the
profile B described in Table 3.3.1. Each individual accepts issue A if and only if
she accepts a majority of the other issues. However, the outcome of the majority
rule is a rejection of issue A, even if a majority of the issues gets accepted by
the same rule. Therefore, the triple (Maj ,B, ICO) constitutes a paradox by
Definition 1.
Using this formalism we can easily devise a strict version of the Ostrogorski
paradox, in which the winning party disagrees on a majority of the issues with
all the individuals. Such a profile is described in Table 3.3.1.
3.4 The Common Structure of Paradoxical Integrity Con-
straints
We can now make a crucial observation concerning the syntactic structure of
the integrity constraints that formalise the paradoxes we have presented so far.
First, for the case of the Condorcet paradox, we observe that the formula en-
coding the transitivity of a preference relation is the implication pab∧pbc → pac.
This formula is equivalent to ¬pab ∨ ¬pbc ∨ pac, which is a clause of size 3, i.e.,
it is a disjunction of three different literals. Second, the formula which appears
in the translation of the discursive dilemma is also equivalent to a clause of
size 3, namely ¬pα ∨ ¬pβ ∨ ¬p¬(α∧β). Third, the formula which formalises the
majoritarian constraint underlying the Ostrogorski paradox, is equivalent to the
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following conjunction of clauses of size 3:
(pA ∨ ¬pE ∨ ¬pF ) ∧ (pA ∨ ¬pE ∨ ¬pS) ∧ (pA ∨ ¬pS ∨ ¬pF ) ∧
∧(¬pA ∨ pE ∨ pF ) ∧ (¬pA ∨ pE ∨ pS) ∧ (¬pA ∨ pS ∨ pF )
Thus, we observe that the integrity constraints formalising the most clas-
sical paradoxes in aggregation theory all feature a clause (i.e., a dis-
junction) of size at least 3.2
3.5 Further Paradoxes on Multiple Issues
In this section we describe two further paradoxes that can be analysed using
our framework of binary aggregation with integrity constraints: the paradox
of divided government and the paradox of multiple elections. Both situations
concern a paradoxical outcome obtained by using the majority rule on an ag-
gregation problem defined on multiple issues. The first paradox can be seen as
an instance of a more general behaviour described by the second paradox.
3.6 The Paradox of Divided Government
The paradox of divided government is a failure of collective rationality that
was pointed out for the first time by Brams et al. (1993). Here we follow the
presentation of Nurmi (1997).
The paradox of divided government. Suppose that 13 voters
(equivalently, groups of voters) can choose for Democratic (D) or
Republican (R) candidate for the following three offices: House of
Representatives (H), Senate (S) and the governor (G). It is a common
assumption that in case the House of Representatives gets a Repub-
lican candidate, then at least one of the remaining offices should go
to Republicans as well. Consider now the following profile:
H S G
Voters 1-3 D D D
Voter 4 D D R
Voter 5 D R D
Voter 6 D R R
Voters 7-9 R D R
Voters 10-12 R R D
Voter 13 R R R
Maj R D D
In this situation it is exactly the combination that had to be avoided
(i.e., RDD) that is elected, even if no individual voted for it.
2This observation is strongly related to a result by Nehring and Puppe (2007) in the frame-
work of judgment aggregation, which characterises the set of paradoxical agendas for the
majority rule as those agendas containing a minimal inconsistent subset of size at least 3.
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This paradox can be easily seen as a failure of collective rationality: it is suffi-
cient to replace the letters D and R with 0 and 1, and to formulate the integrity
constraint as ¬(pH ∧ ¬pS ∧ ¬pG). The binary ballot (1, 0, 0) is therefore ruled
out as irrational, encoding the combination (R,D,D) that needs to be avoided.
This type of paradox can be observed in cases like the elections of a com-
mittee. Even if it is recognised by every individual that a certain committee
structure is unfeasible (i.e., it will not work well together), this may be the
outcome of aggregation if the majority rule is being used.
3.7 The Paradox of Multiple Elections
Whilst the Ostrogorski paradox was devised to stage an attack against repre-
sentative systems of collective choice based on parties, the paradox of multiple
elections (MEP) is based on the observation that when voting directly on multi-
ple issues, a combination that was not supported nor liked by any of the voters
can be the winner of the election (Brams et al., 1998; Lacy and Niou, 2000).
While the original model takes into account the full preferences of individuals
over combinations of issues, if we focus on only those ballots that are submitted
by the individuals, then an instance of the MEP can be represented as a paradox
of collective rationality. Let us consider a simple example.
Multiple election paradox. Suppose three voters need to take
a decision over three binary issues A, B and C. Their ballots are
described in the following table:
A B C
Voter 1 1 0 1
Voter 2 0 1 1
Voter 3 1 1 0
Maj 1 1 1
The outcome of the majority rule in this situation is the acceptance
of all three issues, even if this combination was not voted for by any
of the individuals.
While there seems to be no integrity constraint directly causing this paradox,
we may represent the profile in the example above as a situation in which the
three individual ballots are bound by a budget constraint ¬(pA ∧ pB ∧ pC).
Even if all individuals are giving acceptance to two issues each, the result of the
aggregation is the unfeasible acceptance of all three issues.
As can be deduced from our previous discussion, every instance of the MEP
gives rise to several instances of a binary aggregation paradox for Definition 1.
To see this, it is sufficient to find an integrity constraint that is satisfied by all
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individuals and not by the outcome of the aggregation.3 On the other hand,
every instance of Definition 1 in binary aggregation represents an instance of
the MEP, as the irrational outcome cannot have been voted for by any of the
individuals.
In their paper, Brams et al. (1998) provide many versions of the multi-
ple election paradox, varying the number of issues and the presence of ties.
Lacy and Niou (2000) enrich the model by assuming that individuals have a
preference order over combinations of issues and submit just their top candidate
for the election. They present situations in which, e.g., the winning combination
is a Condorcet loser (i.e., it loses in pairwise comparison with all other combi-
nations). Some answers to the problem raised by the MEP have already been
proposed in the literature on Artificial Intelligence. For instance, a number of
papers have studied the problem of devising sequential elections to avoid the
MEP in case the preferences of the individuals over combinations of multiple
issues are expressed in a suitable preference representation language (Xia et al.,
2011; Conitzer and Xia, 2012).
4 The Majority Rule: Characterisation of Para-
doxes
In this section we generalise the observation made in the Section 3.4 to a full
theorem, characterising the class of integrity constraints that are lifted by the
majority rule as those formulas that can be expressed as a conjunction of clauses
(i.e., disjunctions) of maximal size 2.4 Our characterisation may be considered
a “syntactic counterpart” of a result by Nehring and Puppe (2007) in judgment
aggregation, characterising agendas on which the majority rule outputs a consis-
tent outcome as those agendas that only contain minimally inconsistent subsets
of maximal size 2.
Let us first provide a formal definition of the majority rule. Let NBj be
the set of individuals that accept issue j in profile B. In case the number of
individuals is odd, the majority rule (Maj ) has a unique definition by accepting
issue j if and only if |NBj | >
n+1
2 . For the remainder of this section we make the
assumption that the number of individuals is odd. Recall that an aggregation
procedure is collectively rational (CR) with respect to an integrity constraint
IC if does not generate any paradox with IC (cf. Definition 2).
Theorem 1. The majority rule Maj is CR with respect to IC if and only if IC
is equivalent to a conjunction of clauses of maximal size 2.
3Such a formula always exists. Consider for instance the disjunction of the formulas speci-
fying each of the individual ballots. This integrity constraint forces the result of the aggrega-
tion to be equal to one of the individual ballots on the given profile, thus generating a binary
aggregation paradox from a MEP.
4The theorem presented in this section was published in our previous work
(Grandi and Endriss, 2013) as part of a more systematic analysis of collective rationality
and axiomatic conditions on aggregation procedures. Here we present a simpler version of the
result and we provide a direct proof.
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Proof. (←) Let IC be equivalent to a conjunction of clauses of maximal size 2,
which we indicate as ψ =
∧
kDk. We want to show thatMaj is CR wrt. IC. We
first make the following two observations. First, since two equivalent formulas
define the same set of rational ballots, showing that Maj is CR wrt. IC is
equivalent to showing that Maj is CR wrt. ψ. Second, if the majority rule is
collectively rational wrt. two formulas ϕ1 and ϕ2 then it is also CR wrt. their
conjunction ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2. Thus, it is sufficient to show that Maj is CR wrt. all
clauses Dj to conclude that Maj is CR wrt. their conjunction and hence with
IC. Recall that all clauses Dj have maximal size 2. The case of a clause of size 1
is easily solved. Suppose Dk = pjk or Dk = ¬pjk . Since all individuals must be
rational the profile will be unanimous on issue jk, and thus the majority will
behave accordingly on issue jk, in accordance with the constraint Dk. Let us
then focus on a clause IC = ℓj ∨ ℓk, where ℓj and ℓk are two distinct literals,
i.e., atoms or negated atoms. A paradoxical profile for the majority rule with
respect to this integrity constraint features a first majority of individuals not
satisfying literal ℓj , and a second majority of individuals not satisfying literal
ℓk. By the pigeonhole principle these two majorities must have a non-empty
intersection, i.e., there exists one individual that does not satisfy both literals ℓj
and ℓk, but this is incompatible with the requirement that all individual ballots
satisfy IC.
(⇒) Let us now assume for the sake of contradiction that IC is not equivalent
to a conjunction of clauses of maximal size 2. We will now build a paradoxical
situation for the majority rule with respect to IC.
We need the following crucial definition: Call minimally falsifying partial
assignment (mifap-assignment) for an integrity constraint IC an assignment
to some of the propositional variables that cannot be extended to a satisfying
assignment, although each of its proper subsets can. We now associate with
each mifap-assignment ρ for IC a conjunction Cρ = ℓ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ℓk, where ℓi = pi
if ρ(pi) = 1 and ℓi = ¬pi if ρ(pi) = 0 for all propositional symbols pi on which
ρ is defined. The conjunction Cρ represents the mifap-assignment ρ and it is
clearly inconsistent with IC. The negation of Cρ is hence a disjunction, with
the property of being a minimal clause implied by IC. Such formulas are known
in the literature on knowledge representation as the prime implicates of IC,
and it is a known result that every propositional formula is equivalent to the
conjunction of its prime implicates (see, e.g., Marquis, 2000). Thus, we can
represent IC with the equivalent formula
∧
ρ ¬Cρ of all mifap-assignments ρ for
IC. From our initial assumption we can infer that at least one mifap-assignment
ρ∗ has size > 2, for otherwise IC would be equivalent to a conjunction of 2-
clauses.
We are now ready to show a paradoxical situation for the majority rule with
respect to IC. Consider the following profile. Let y1, y2, y3 be three proposi-
tional variables that are fixed by ρ∗. Let the first individual i1 accept the issue
associated with y1 if ρ(y1) = 0, and reject it otherwise, i.e., let b1,1 = 1−ρ∗(y1).
Furthermore, let i1 agree with ρ
∗ on the remaining propositional variables. By
minimality of ρ∗, this partial assignment can be extended to a satisfying assign-
ment for IC, and let Bi1 be such an assignment. Repeat the same construction
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y1 y2 y3
i1 1-ρ
∗(y1) ρ
∗(y2) ρ
∗(y3)
i2 ρ
∗(y1) 1-ρ
∗(y2) ρ
∗(y3)
i3 ρ
∗(y1) ρ
∗(y2) 1-ρ
∗(y3)
Maj ρ∗(y1) ρ
∗(y2) ρ
∗(y3)
Table 5: A general paradox for the majority rule wrt. a clause of size 3.
for individual i2, this time changing the value of ρ
∗ on y2 and extending it to
a satisfying assignment to obtain Bi2 . The same construction for i3, changing
the value of ρ∗ on issue y3 and extending it to a satisfying assignment Bi3 .
Recall that there are at least 3 individuals in N . If there are other individuals,
let individuals i3s+1 have the same ballot Bi1 , individuals i3s+2 ballot Bi2 and
individuals i3s+3 ballot Bi3 . The basic profile for 3 issues and 3 individuals is
shown in Table 4. In this profile, which can easily be generalised to the case
of more than 3 individuals, there is a majority supporting ρ∗ on every variable
on which ρ∗ is defined. Since ρ∗ is a mifap-assignment and therefore cannot be
extended to an assignment satisfying IC, the majority rule in this profile is not
collectively rational with respect to IC.
In case the number of individuals is even the majority rule does not have a unique
definition, to account for the case in which exactly half of the voters accept an
issue and half of the voters reject it, and a characterisation along the lines of The-
orem 1 cannot be proven. We refer to our previous work (Grandi and Endriss,
2013) for a more detailed analysis of the set of integrity constraints that are
lifted by the majority rule for an even number of individuals.
5 Conclusions
The first conclusion that can be drawn from this paper dedicated to paradoxes of
aggregation is that the majority rule is to be avoided when dealing with collec-
tive choices over multiple issues. This fact stands out as a counterpart to May’s
Theorem (1952), which proves that the majority rule is the only aggregation
rule for a single binary issue that satisfies a set of highly desirable conditions.
The sequence of paradoxes we have analysed in this paper shows that this is
not the case when multiple issues are involved. While this fact may not add
anything substantially new to the existing literature, the wide variety of para-
doxical situations encountered in this paper stresses even further the negative
features of the majority rule on multi-issue domains.
A second more significant conclusion is that a large number of paradoxes
of Social Choice Theory share a common structure, and that this structure is
formalised by our Definition 1, which stands out as a truly general definition of
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paradox in aggregation theory. Moreover, by analysing the integrity constraints
that underlie some of the most classical paradoxes, we were able to identify
a common syntactic feature of paradoxical constraints. Starting from this ob-
servation, we have provided a full characterisation of the integrity constraints
that are lifted by the majority rule, as those formulas that are equivalent to a
conjunction of clauses of size at most 2.
To the best of our knowledge Definition 1 is the first general definition of
paradox in aggregation theory. However, the paradoxical situations presented
in this paper constitute a fragment of the problems that can be encountered in
the formalisation of collective choice problems. For instance, paradoxical sit-
uations concerning voting procedures (Nurmi, 1999; Saari, 1989), which take
as input a set of preferences and output a set of winning candidates, are not
included in our analysis. Recent work on paradoxes of aggregation pointed
at similarities within different frameworks, e.g., comparing two such examples
(Pigozzi, 2005), or proposing a geometric approach for the study of paradoxical
situations (Eckert and Klamler, 2009) using the theoretical setting developed
by Saari (1995). There also exists a considerable amount of work exploring
the relation between preference aggregation and other frameworks of aggrega-
tion (List and Pettit, 2004; Dietrich and List, 2007; Grossi, 2009, 2010; Porello,
2010). Our approach is similar to that of Dietrich and List (2007). In their work,
the authors embed the framework of preference aggregation into the framework
of judgment aggregation in general logics (Dietrich, 2007) by using a simple
first-order logic of orders. While their aim is more theoretical and their setting
is more general, our analysis has the advantage of being based on a very simple
logical setting, without losing the generality which is needed for the analysis of
such a wide range of paradoxical situations. By doing so we aim at stressing the
propositional (i.e., binary) nature of many paradoxes which were encountered
in the study of social choice.
The last conclusive statement we would like to put forward regards the inter-
pretation of some of the paradoxes presented in this chapter. We have already
remarked how some of these examples have been employed in the literature to
show weaknesses and advantages of either the direct approach to democratic
choice (represented by issue-by-issue aggregation) or the representative one. In
particular the two paradoxes presented in Section 3.5 (the paradox of divided
government and the MEP) seem to suggest that direct decisions over multiple
issues should be avoided, at least when issues are not completely independent
from one another. In our view, elections over multi-issue domains cannot be es-
caped: not only do they represent a model for the aggregation of more complex
objects like preferences and judgments, as seen in Section 3.1 and 3.2, but they
also stand out as one of the biggest challenges to the design of more complex
automated systems for collective decision making. A crucial problem in the
modelling of real-world situations of collective choice is that of identifying the
set of issues that best represent a given domain of aggregation, and devising an
integrity constraint that models correctly the correlations between those issues.
This problem obviously represents a serious obstacle to a mechanism designer,
and is moreover open to manipulation. However, a promising direction for fu-
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ture work consists in structuring collective decision problems with more detailed
models before the aggregation takes place, e.g., by discovering a shared order
of preferential dependencies between issues (Lang and Xia, 2009; Airiau et al.,
2011), facilitating the definition of collective choice procedures on complex do-
mains without having to elicit the full preferences of individuals. Such models
can be employed in the design and the implementation of automated decision
systems, in which a safe aggregation, i.e., one that avoids paradoxical situations,
is of the utmost necessity.
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